Grexit and IR Theory.... Arrgh!

Some of you may be familiar with the Monkey Cage, a scholarly blog run by the Washington Post that looks at current events through the lens of Ivory Tower research. I'm a fan, and have a link to the Monkey Cage in my blog list to the right.

In early May, Nicholas Sambanis (Yale University) and Ioannis Galariotis (Athens University) posted a very interesting take on the Greek financial crisis that looked at what was going on through the lens of contemporary International Relations theory (link here). I have written a thing or two in this blog about the Greek mess and there will be several cliffhangers in the summer of 2015 to keep us awake at night, the first of which comes June 5 when Greece is scheduled to make a 300 million Euro debt service payment to the International Monetary Fund (see link). Europe is having a rough go of it these days. In addition to the prospect for a Grexit, many Euro Zone economies are in serious trouble, and Britain has just returned David Cameron's Conservatives to power, in part, on a promise to hold a referendum on the UK's membership in the European Union by 2017. One barometer for some of the public anxieties over Euro Zone economies can be seen in the street demonstrations outside ECB headquarters in Frankfurt earlier this year and the April assault on ECB President Mario Draghi. 

However, in the event you didn't have enough to worry about in Europe, the focus of Sambanis and Galariotis in their Monkey Cage piece is on the implications of a "Grexit" for regional security. It is a well-thought out take on the crisis, but it also represents one of the reasons I dislike International Relations theory sometimes makes me crazy. After alternately filtering the Greek mess through three popular IR frameworks (Structural Realism, Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism) their conclusion is essentially that a "Grexit" will not matter much for Greece's security. Moreover, that "on the fence" conclusion is, they acknowledge, contingent on numerous assumptions. Yet again, I am reminded of President Truman's plea to his economic advisors that they find him a "one armed economist." Why did I just read this?

Don't misunderstand me here, I think Sambanis and Galariotis have produced a great piece. Yet, the limitations of their piece are mere reflections of the limitations of IR Theory to help us understand what is happening around us. Critics of international relations scholars often point to our "failure" to predict the end of the Cold War. Indeed, many scholars were taken aback by the fall of the Soviet Union and the rapid changes in Eastern Europe that followed. As I survey the numerous international flash-points around the world, the explanatory power of IR Theory leaves me wanting. Whether it's Russia in Ukraine, the rise of the Islamic State, tensions in the South China Sea, or political tensions in Europe that threaten to undo the entire postwar project, I am regularly confronted with "on the one hand 'X', but on the other hand 'Y'." I suppose that is why Daniel Drezner's only-slightly-tongue-in-cheek analysis of the weakness of IR Theory in dealing with a zombie attack resonates.

I can certainly be taken to task for launching a grenade at IR Theory and that it deserves a more in-depth analysis than I have given it here. As proof of the short-shrift I have given the topic, the European Journal of International Relations devoted its September 2013 issue to asking whether IR Theory was at an end? Happy reading! However, as you read Sambanis and Galariotis, perhaps ask whether their analysis is trapped by the assumptions of each of the paradigms they consider? Ask yourself whether Turkey deserves the emphasis it receives in their analysis? Would the prospect of renewed Greco-Turkish tensions be a "factor" in a "Grexit?" Sure. But will it be the world's focus if Greece goes over a financial cliff in the months ahead? I wouldn't bet on it. The financial community seems to think it's better prepared for a "Grexit" than it was in 2012 when Greece last flirted with catastrophe. However, I wouldn't bet the farm on that either. 

I've complained about this before. Indeed, my very first blog post here was on this topic (link). Theory can give us a rough guide as to what might happen given certain assumptions. But one of the reasons European officials are working so hard to avert a "Grexit" is because no one particularly wants to test any of those theories. Yet, I sometimes wonder what difference it would make if they did?